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v

JURISDICTION
Appeal s has ji ir:i s :i i ctic n over this
n

^-?.(a)-

matter pursuant Lu U U I , «.ode Annotated, Section
3(2 '

- this is an appeal from a final judgment and

order *:. . domestic re] at ions action.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.
order

c
the

sale

* property

because

there

was

no

i.

2.

The Trial Court did not error in finding a

value IUJ. ihe o-+ Law Saloon based upon the testimony
presented at tr.oa,
3.

'"'"i*- Trial

':)!r:S

j visioi. of The marital

and circumstances of the parties are considered.
4•

'"

i .he

cause of action tor tn^ uptioi: Agreement ;j t;:e appellee.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As more fully discussed in Point
the sound discretion <

+

of the Argument,

*»..> ','—,-. • "on-- ^ n establishing

the values for asset.
of sa Id assets wil", .

T

: .. _;• ,;.

.n

\)>~ overturned unless r.ne Trial

C c I lr I" •

•

abuse or discretion. Mile 52 ta; , i ::ah Kuies or Civil

1

*r

Procedure; also see authorities cited in Point I of this
brief.
Conclusions of Law are reviewed for correctness and
are given no special deference on appeal. Also see
authorities cited in Point I of this brief.
RECORD ON APPEAL
References to the Trial Transcript will be made as
follows: (TT

) . References to the Findings of Fact

entered by the Trial Court will be made as follows: (FF
). References to exhibits entered at trial will be
made as follows: (Ex.

) . Addenda in the brief will be

referred to as follows: (Add.

).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND DETERMINATIVE CASELAW
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann.:
Section
authority

to

30-3-5,
a

Utah

Code

divorce

court

Annotated,
to

make

provides
equitable

distributions of the property accumulated by the parties
during the marriage.
Caselaw:
There is no specific case which is determinative of
the issues in the case at bar.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce
entered by the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for

2

Grand County, State o f U t a h . V a r i o u s P r e - T r i a l H e a r i n g s
were conducted and interim orders were entered concerning
support, property division and the control

: f 1:1 le Oi 1 til aw

Saloon

scheduled o n

operation.

Trial

w a s originally

L »- • . •

I lit1

11 i i h i ill i I i ' I i i I n 'Hi ni

iii.lit t e r

on said <JV •. although the parties and their witnesses,
r^ r'\ witness, were present and prepared
to proceed. By stipulation of the parties, the trial was
reschedule^ for ar^
^l-jj'^..

^tuaily conducted

*;.. ....... '

racier

..:...

Januar^

,

ajL\„^:.t.

i

entered its Memorandum Decision on January b , 1995. T h e
Fi nd - ;

I'Vn I (lici *.' i.Ha 1 f. in I'1"!'"1) "i1 "uni

-

Decree of Divorce were e n t e r e d on February

Defendant/Appellant

•
1995 (Add.

f i l e d Notice of Appeal

11I t h e

p r e s e n t c a s e on Mai
STATEMENT

Appellee offers t-• following statement of r e l e v a n t
fac t s :i i I i '"I • ' • i e s e i
1.

• The Plaintiff/Appellee
•"

referrea

: •

Lu as

(hereinafter

the D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t
.W "

^ nickname

referred

(hereinafter

used b y D e f e n d a n t

Kenneth Wayne Monders) were married o n A p r i l 25, 1987 at
L a w V e g a s , d-aii. ^ounty, N e v a d a

3

(E E 2)

i

2.

The parties separated in November of 1993 and

have lived separate and apart since that time (FF3).
3.

There were no children born as issue of the

marriage (FF5).
4.

At the time of their marriage, Cheryl was

employed at a motel and restaurant in Moab, Utah and she
also owned and operated a bar in Moab known as the Outlaw
Saloon. The assets of the bar had been purchased with
Cheryl's money. She operated the bar in a rented building
(FF 6).
5+

At

the

time of

the marriage, Cheryl had

invested about $20,000 of her money in establishing the
original

Outlaw

Saloon. She

also had

$9,090.00

in

currency in a safety deposit box, the sum $15,524.00 in
a savings account at Williamsburg Bank, the sum of
$9,000.00 in an IRA account, the sum of $685.30 in her
checking account, an ounce of gold, motel stock worth
$11,445.00 and a $10,000.00 tax exempt bearer bond (FF
7).
6.

J.W. brought no assets into the marriage except

a 1975 Thunderbird automobile and his clothing (FF 8).
7.

At the time of the marriage, J.W. was employed

at a approximately $4.00 per hour as a janitor (TT 271).
Following the marriage, J.W. worked regularly in the bar,

4

e x c e p t for three

(3) m o n t h s w h e n he a t t e m p t e d to start

a b u s i n e s s for h i m s e l f

^-

Cheryl m a n a g e d a n d a l s o

i /c i: I :e ::i :i i : 11 L = 1: !a :i : • it 11
8,

j'tii-.

I

Due to the scheduled demolition of the building
g

Lor

an a l t e r n a t i v e cite I O I nei u a : u u

^, ±y'

" r , T ' contracted '

from ;^.

f^

3

i.i. on O c t o b e r
:

-u:rchnse

^f faid building

tc-Lal ccsi

She paid

$23,000 as a down paymer.' w* i rh rame from her pre-marital
CI ler } J
$10,601

* i u HH and

:r;:i her father's estate

years from 1ler mother's estate m

i

*:»9J

i i ill: ler :i ted

. ;r. the same day,

her uncle granted Cheryl and J.W. an option to purchase
an

adjacent,

>

* provided

exercised within one (
9.

the

option

was

year (FF ] 2)

< .. .

* . ...

i.e

existing building to cieate a place for the o p e r a t i o n of
1 11 > I

1

I

m1" I I

I II

I I in '

r$-n\\t n i p

1 j nq

|

p r e - m a r i t a - ur i n h e r i t e d p r o p e r L y

ml'

i Ft

m< '

( | i i |«i

r l w.i | y I "" .3

u ) .

C h e r y l h a d i n c o r p o r a t e d the O u t l a w Saloon i n
19

.

is its sole s h a r e h o l d e r and, in e x c h a n g e for

the s h a r e s , she c o n v e y e d all of r.h< o r o p e r t y a n d a s s e t s
of

tJI: 1 E:

:: i :i gi i la 1 Oi i t ] e i <

3 a :i ::1 3 0 1 porati 01 1.

Throughout the marriage, she has remained the sole owner
of all of the shares of the corporation (FF 14).
11.

In an attempt to get some contribution from

J.W., Cheryl entered into a written agreement on March
2, 1992 whereby she agreed to sell one-half of the
business and property known as The Outlaw Saloon to J.W.
The agreement estimates the value of Cheryl's investment
in the business and property at $60,000 and provides for
J.W. to buy a one-half interest in same for $30,000 under
terms and conditions outlined in the agreement (FF 21).
The agreement was breached by both parties but the Court
found the agreement helpful in determining the state of
mind of the parties in valuing their assets prior to the
commencement of the divorce action (FF 22).
12.

Every tax return showed Cheryl as the sole

proprietor of the bar before its incorporation and every
tax return showed Cheryl as the sole owner of the
corporation and the person responsible for filing the
corporate tax returns after the corporation was created
(FF 16).
13.

At the time of the entry of the Decree of

Divorce, The Outlaw Saloon building was providing living
quarters for Cheryl and it also provided her sole source

6

of employment (TT 205). J.W. was residing in Salt Lake
City and was employed there (TT 275-276).
14.

The Court found that the value of The Outlaw

Saloon was $155,000. The parties still owed Cheryl's
uncle $43,000 (FF 23). The net value of The Outlaw Saloon
operation was the sum of $112,000. The Court found that
Cheryl had invested $60,000 of her separate pre-marital
or inherited property in the business as of March of 1993
(FF 25). The Court found that she should recover all of
that investment (FF 25).
15.
marital

The Court found that the bar has been a joint
venture but

that

Cheryl

alone had made a

substantial financial investment in that venture (FF 22).
The Court found that the bar was a marital asset but that
an equitable distribution would require that Cheryl
receive more than one-half of that asset

(FF 22) .

Additionally, the Court found that there were two (2)
significant factors which also required a less than even
distribution of the asset, namely, that Cheryl was 51
years old and suffered from an injury that had seriously
limited her ability to work while J.W. was 38 years old,
able-bodied and did not have as great a need for the
marital assets as did Cheryl (FF 26). Additionally, the
actual increase in the value of the business operation

7

was attributable to the increased property values in
Grand County which had occurred as a result of economic
changes in the area rather than the efforts of the
parties themselves (FF 26).
16.

Cheryl

accumulated

had

$11,000

in

contributions

and

interest in her IRA account during the

marriage. One-half of the amount of the IRA account was
awarded to J.W., namely $5,500.00 (FF 28 and 29).
17.

J.W.

was

awarded

one-fourth

(1/4) of the

increased equity in The Outlaw Saloon operation and its
property which was the sum of $13,000. Cheryl was awarded
three-fourths (3/4) of the increased equity (FF 26 and
27) .
18.

The

Court

awarded

J.W.

a

total

property

settlement in the sum of $18,500.00 bearing interest at
the legal rate of seven (7%) percent per annum from
January 1, 1995 until fully paid. The Court secured the
property settlement against the real estate and set
payments at the rate of $250.00 per month, amortized over
eight (8) years (FF 29).
19.

Although the parties may initially have had a

chance of legally compelling Cheryl's uncle to consummate
the sale of the adjacent lot, prospects of success were
dimmed by their failure to pursue their claim. The Court

8

found that their claim to the adjacent lot had little or
no value and awarded the claim to Cheryl because she had
the best chance of being able to deal with her uncle for
the adjacent lot, she had been awarded the building which
partially encroached onto the lot, and she was currently
renting the lot (FF 24).
20.

The Trial Court entered its Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce on February 17,
1995.
21.

J.W.'s Notice of Appeal was timely filed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Trial Court did not impose sanctions or order
the

sale

of

the

property

because

there

was

no

justification or reason for so doing. Appellant contends
that he was unfairly prejudiced at trial because, during
his cross-examination of the Appellee, she testified that
she desired not to sell The Outlaw Saloon. Since her
"desires" are immaterial to the determination of the
value of The Outlaw Saloon as of the date of the trial,
and since no sanctions, continuances or requests for the
sale of property were even made to the Trial Court, there
can be no basis for imposing sanctions or ordering a sale
of the property.

9

The Trial Court received testimony concerning the
value of The Outlaw Saloon property and the lack of value
associated with bar type businesses in Moab, Utah. The
trial

testimony

was

consistent

with

all

of

the

information provided by the Appellee during responses to
discovery. The Appellant failed to provide any testimony
concerning the value of the business and/or the real
estate upon which same was located, claiming that he
"assumed" that some future sale of the property might be
used to establish a value. Since the Trial Court has to
establish a value at the time of the Decree in order to
determine an equitable distribution of assets, the Trial
Court did not error in setting the values based upon the
only competent testimony presented at trial.
The Trial Court's division of marital assets was
equitable

when

circumstances

the
of

comparative

the

parties

contributions
were

taken

and
into

consideration. The Appellee is 51 years old and suffers
from a severe injury which affects her earning capacity.
She also provided all of the investment capital that
developed the business. The Appellant is 38 years of age,
able-bodied, employed and contributed nothing by way of
investment capital to the business. The Trial Court's

10

division cannot be found to be an abuse of discretion
and, therefore, should be affirmed.
The Trial Court did not error in granting the
Appellee the cause of action for the Option Agreement.
The cause of action had little or no value. The property
was owned by the Appellee's uncle. Appellee was awarded
the adjacent property and the building which encroached
upon the optioned land. At the time of Trial she was
renting the optioned property and paying consideration
therefore. The Trial Court's award cannot be found to be
clearly erroneous and, therefore, should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I
SINCE THE APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE
WHICH SUPPORTED THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND,
DESPITE SUCH EVIDENCE, DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FINDINGS WERE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO
CONSIDER AN ATTACK ON THE TRIAL COURT'S DISTRIBUTION OF
PROPERTY.
A review of Appellant's argument indicates that the
Appellant is really attacking the Trial Court's Findings
of Fact and not just its Conclusions of Law. The Trial
Court entered numerous and express Findings of Fact in
the case at bar. Those Findings should be reviewed in
light of the guidelines found in Rule 52(a), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a) provides, in relevant
part, as follows:
11

Rule 52: Findings by the Court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury..., the
court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered
pursuant to Rule 58A;...Findings of Fact,
whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. The findings of a master, to
the extent that the court adopts them,
shall be considered as the findings of
the court. It will be sufficient if the
findings of fact and conclusions of law
are stated orally and recorded in open
court following the close of the evidence
or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court...
[Emphasis added by Order of the
Utah Supreme Court on October
30, 1986 and became effective
on January 1, 1987.]
An analysis of the 1987 modification of Rule 52(a)
demonstrates a clear intent to avoid retrying the facts
of the case at the Appellate level. Since a divorce
action is an equitable case, the Trial Courts have been
given broad discretion in making awards. Riche v. Riche,
784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989); Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d
922 (Utah App. 1992); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156
(Utah App. 1989); Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979 (Utah App.
1989); Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d
Appellate

Courts

have

197

traditionally

(Utah 1985).

granted

great

deference to the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and do
12

not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. The
Appellate Courts accord substantial deference to the
Trial

Court's

considerable

Findings

latitude

and

in

give

the

fashioning

Trial

an

Court

appropriate

relief. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992);
Woodward

v.

Additionally,

Woodward,
Appellate

709

P.2d

Courts

393
have

(Utah

1985).

traditionally

deferred to the Trial Court for purposes of judging the
credibility of witnesses. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; Myers, supra; Shioji, supra; Riche, supra.
In Riche v. Riche, supra, this Court stated:
Husband, in his brief on appeal, refers
this court to evidence which conflicts
with the trial court's findings and
supports his contention that he should
have been awarded custody of the four
children. However, Husband does not
"marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to
be N against the clear weight of the
evidence,' thus making them %clearly
erroneous.'" Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886
(quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). See
also Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,
1070 (Utah 1985); Harker v. Condominiums
Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). Therefore, we
decline to further consider Husband's
attack on the court's findings as to
custody. (Riche, supra p. 468). [Emphasis
added].
In Shioji, the Supreme Court has also expressly
provided:
13

On appeal from a judgment of the Trial
Court, our [Appellate Court] role is not
to substitute our own findings for those
of the Trial Court, but to examine the
record for evidence supporting the
j udgment.
(Shioji, supra, at 201) [Emphasis added]
Given that express statement of the role of the
Appellate Court, the Appellant

is charged with the

responsibility of (1) marshaling all the evidence in
support of the Findings, and (2) demonstrating that,
despite that evidence, the Trial Court's Findings are so
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of
the evidence.
In the case at bar, J.W. contends that the Trial
Court erred in establishing its valuation of The Outlaw
Saloon, in its division of the marital assets and in its
award of the cause of action for the option property to
Cheryl. A review of J.W.'s actual argument (more fully
discussed in Points II through V of this brief) reveals
that J.W. is actually attacking the Findings of Fact of
the Trial Court and, therefore, he has not applied the
proper Standard of Review. He has not marshaled all of
the evidence which was presented to the Trial Court nor
made any attempt to evaluate the Court's reasoning nor
has he demonstrated that the reasoning or the Findings
based thereon were clearly erroneous. Since the Appellant

14

has failed to marshal all of the evidence and, despite
such evidence, demonstrate that the Court's Findings
concerning the valuation of the marital assets and the
distribution of same were clearly erroneous, this Court
should refuse to consider any further attack on the Trial
Court's

award of said items. Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d

478 (Utah App. 1991).
Conclusions of Law are reviewed for correctness and
are given no special deference on appeal. Howell v.
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991); Smith v. Smith,
793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990).
II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE SANCTIONS OR ORDER THE
SALE OF PROPERTY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION TO
DO SO.
The Appellant J.W. contends that he was unfairly
prejudiced at trial because the Appellee Cheryl testified
that she did not desire to sell the Outlaw Saloon. An
examination of the actual facts of the case demonstrates
that

the

Appellant's

position

is

incorrect.

J.W.

submitted numerous rounds of discovery in this case.
Cheryl responded to the first set of interrogatories and
then a second set of interrogatories. In the Second Set
of Interrogatories, Interrogatory No. 19 asked, "describe
in detail all efforts undertaken by you, or anyone on

15

your behalf, to sell, or offer for sale, the business
known as The Outlaw Saloon, and the real property on
which the Outlaw Saloon is located..." (Add. B ) . Cheryl
indicated that she had told many people that the business
would be for sale upon the completion of the divorce. In
Interrogatory 20 she was asked "please identify any
appraisals,

property

evaluations

or

re-evaluations

conducted on the real property and the business known as
The Outlaw Saloon..." (Add. B) . In responding Cheryl
referred to work previously done by Bob Muir which had
set a value of the business and property at between
$150,000 and $160,000. It expressly made reference to the
fact that the business portion was worth only 6% of one
year's profit (Add. B Interrogatory 20). Mr. Muir died
and was not available for trial. In Interrogatory 16 of
said second set, Cheryl had designated Joe Kingsley as
an expert with respect to the market value of The Outlaw
Saloon (Add. B Interrogatory 16). Additionally, Plaintiff
provided information concerning the valuation of the
business by Joe Kingsley as soon as it was available
which was prior to the originally scheduled trial date
on December 2, 1994. J.W.'s counsel acknowledges that he
had that information when he cross-examined Joe Kingsley
at the time of trial

(TT 21, 25). Mr. Kingsleyfs

16

testimony established a valuation of the real estate
package at approximately $155,000. He then went on to
indicate that while he had not examined the business
records to value the business itself,

bar businesses in

Moab had very little value (TT 12-13, 28-29, 32-34).
Additionally,

in Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's

Second Request for Admissions (Add. C) , Cheryl stated
that she was "willing to sell the business known as The
Outlaw Saloon, including all of the personal property
used in said business, together with the real estate on
which the business is located and all of her rights to
the option agreement

for sums between $150,000 and

$175,000 provided that certain problems concerning title
to the adjacent piece of property upon which a portion
of the bar actually sits could be resolved for various
sums of money (See Add. C

Admission 1-3). All of this

information was disclosed by Cheryl well in advance of
trial. From the discovery it was clearly understood that
Cheryl had consulted with experts and was prepared to use
them at trial and that she believed that the business and
all of its properties, including the real estate and the
Option Agreement, would value between

$150,000 and

$160,000. Cheryl stated nothing at trial or in her case-
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in-chief that changed any of the information that had
been provided during discovery.
During cross-examination, J.Wfs attorney questioned
Cheryl concerning her desires about selling the business.
At that time, Cheryl testified that she did not want to
sell the business because it was her only form of support
(TT 205). Those remarks were elicited by J.W.'s counsel
during cross-examination. At that time, counsel expressed
surprise

(TT 205-210). The Court asked why this was

relevant and gave a substantial lecture about the need
for each of the parties to present their own evidence (TT
205-210). The Court expressly asked J.W.fs counsel what
he wanted to do (TT 209). At no time was a continuance
requested, contrary to the statements now made in the
appeal brief. At no time were sanctions requested, as now
indicated in the appeal brief. At no time was a finding
of contempt requested, contrary to the statements now
made in the appeal brief. No request for an order forcing
the sale of the property was ever made. The only thing
requested by J.W. was that the Court consider Cheryl's
changes in testimony as affecting Cheryl's credibility
(TT 205-210).
As pointed out by the Trial Judge (TT 208), the
purpose of the trial is to establish the value of the
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assets, to determine whether portions thereof are premarital or marital, and to make an equitable distribution
of same. The judge expressly asked why some future sale
of the property would be relevant to any of those issues
(TT 205-210) • J.W. never established any need for or
relevance of

some future sale for the property.

In reality, both parties entered the Courtroom on
the day of trial knowing that the caselaw required them
to establish the value of the assets as of the date of
the divorce. Howell, supra. Each party has the burden of
proof to go forward with his or her case and establish
the value of the assets, the character of same and an
equitable distribution. J.W. now contends that he was
surprised because he expected that the Court would order
a sale of the property. Some future sale which may not
have occurred for years, would not have given the Court
the information it needed as of the date of the trial.
The existence of a future buyer, or the lack thereof, the
economic conditions at the time of some future sale, the
distress or lack thereof of the parties, all such matters
could affect a future sale and yet none would have any
bearing on the value of the property at the time of the
divorce and the trial judge so noted (TT 205-210) .

19

Cheryl offered the testimony of Joe Kingsley at the
time of trial. Mr. Kingsley established a valuation for
the real estate. He also testified that bar businesses
in Moab
discovery

had

little, if

which

had

any, value. The

been

provided

by

extensive

Cheryl

was

consistent with all the testimony which was offer in
Cheryl's case-in-chief.
Irrespective of any sale, J.W. had no evidence to
contradict anything that had been offered by Cheryl in
her case-in-chief. He offered no evidence of the value
the business. He offered no evidence of the value the
real

estate. He offered no expert to evaluate the

likelihood of success of a legal action concerning the
option property. In short, J. W. offered no case at all.
Even his own testimony was filled with contradiction and
was woefully lacking in any documentary evidence at all.
He could not even identify his own tax returns (TT 2 61) .
Since Cheryl had fully responded to all of the
discovery requests put to her and since nothing was said
in

her

case-in-chief

which

altered

the

discovery

materials in any way, there was no reason for the Court
to determine that she had failed to fully cooperate in
discovery. Rule 26(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
only requires that responses to discovery be supplemented
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if a party knows that a response, though correct when
made, is no longer true and "the circumstances are such
that a failure to amend the response is in substance a
knowing concealment". The fact that Cheryl testified
during cross- examination that she did not want to sell
the bar because it was her only source of income does not
constitute a "knowing concealment" within the meaning of
Rule 26(e). In fact, J.W.'s counsel himself solicited
those remarks. Had he not done so, there would have been
nothing in the record indicating that she desired or did
not desire to sell the property. Either way, it was
immaterial as the Court could have ordered a sale of the
property had it been necessary or advisable, irrespective
of the desires of the parties.
J.W.

then

tries

to disguise his own

lack of

preparation by claiming that Cheryl was "springing" this
evidence on him at trial. How could Cheryl have ever
anticipated that her husband would come to trial with no
expert witnesses or evidence to establish the value of
the assets, considering that all of the caselaw required
him to do so in order to carry his burden of proof if he
contended that the value of the business was anything
different than that disclosed by Cheryl during discovery?
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J.W. contends that because he believed both parties
wanted to sell the property "it was only logical to
assume that the best way to optimize the value of the
assets was to put them on the market" (Appellant's Brief
at pg. 13). Such logic ignores the fact that the Trial
Court had to establish the value of the property at the
time of trial in order to be able to determine an
equitable distribution of same (Howell, supra). J.W.'s
"logical assumption" was based upon his mistaken beliefs
that he was going to get half of the value of the
property and that the property might sell within some
reasonably foreseeable time period. From the evidence,
it was much more likely that the Court would find that
J.W. had little or no marital interest in The Outlaw
Saloon

and,

therefore,

it would have been

totally

unnecessary to order a sale, particularly a forced sale
which could have driven the value even lower.
Appellee

agrees

that

the

cases

cited

by

the

Appellant are an expression of the caselaw, although
somewhat

outdated,

as

it applies

to

specific

fact

situations. Appellee contends, however, that the facts
in the cited cases are not material to the issues in this
case. In

Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982),

the Supreme Court was dealing with a case that involved
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a finding of contempt by the Trial Court. There was no
finding that Cheryl committed any contempt in the case
at bar and, in fact, J.W. never even requested such a
finding. J.W. contends that Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871
(Utah 1979), requires the Appellate Court to remand this
case for the taking of further evidence; however, the
Read case does not stand for such a proposition. In Read
the Appellate Court found that the Trial Court's property
award might reflect a degree of punishment against the
husband for his extramarital conduct. That belief was
based upon a very disparate and apparently inequitable
division of the assets which awarded the wife over 90%
of clearly marital assets. The case has no application
to the case at bar as no issues of punitive awards or
extramarital conduct were raised and any disparity in the
distribution of property was justified at length by the
Trial Court. J.W. then cites Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d
1144 (Utah App. 1988). He contends that Naranjo requires
an Appellate Court to make changes in the Trial Court's
ruling if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication
of law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error.
J.W. has failed to establish that anything in the Trial
Court's

decision

was

based

upon

a

substantial

or

prejudicial error or an abuse of discretion. Indeed, none
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of the

fact

situations

in the cases cited by the

Appellant have any bearing at all on the fact situation
in the case at bar.
Cheryl presented a coherent case-in-chief at the
time

of

trial.

She

offered

expert

testimony

and

substantial documentation to support her position. She
established and traced a considerable amount of premarital property into the assets being valued by the
Court. The Court found that it was equitable to return
her investment to her and give her a proportional share
of the appreciation on her investment which had occurred
due primarily to the economy (See, Burke v. Burke, 733
P.2d 133 (Utah 1987) wherein the Supreme Court affirmed
the

Trial Court

award to the wife of all of the

appreciated value of her sole and separate property even
though the appreciation had occurred during the marriage
because it resulted primarily from economic changes). The
Court entered findings that established the value of the
assets. Those values were consistent with all of the
evidence and with the material that had been provided by
Cheryl during discovery.
By contrast, J.W. offered himself. He testified that
his sparkling personality had built the business and was
justification for an award of one-half of the entire
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value of the business (TT 250) . He offered nothing else.
He acknowledged that he came into the marriage with
nothing and that he never contributed any money or
property to the enterprise at all (TT 53-54; 264-265).
The Court awarded him one-fourth of the appreciation of
the business property
contributions

and one-half

to Cheryl's

of

the marital

IRA account by way of a

property award. Such an award actually exceeds the
evidence presented by J.W. at the time of trial. The
Court entered the only reasonable findings it could have
entered given the complete lack of preparation and
testimony offered by J.W. at trial.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN FINDING A VALUE FOR THE
OUTLAW SALOON BASED UPON THE TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT
TRIAL.
Appellant is required to marshal all of the evidence
in favor of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and,
having

done

so,

he

is

further

charged

with

the

responsibility of demonstrating that the Findings were
clearly erroneous. In the case at bar, J.W. has not only
failed to marshal all of the evidence but has actually
ignored it. The Court entered the following Findings of
Fact with respect to the valuation of The Outlaw Saloon
and the property upon which it was located (Add. A ) :
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FF 12

On October 2, 1990, Cheryl contracted to
purchase a building lot from her uncle
for $23,000 down and the balance of
$57,000 to be financed at the rate of 10%
per annum over ten years. (The balance of
this Finding is omitted as it does not
expressly deal with the valuation of the
real estate).

FF 13

Cheryl then began to remodel and improve
the existing building to create a place
to operate her bar. All of the remodeling
funds came from Cheryl's pre-marital or
inherited property.

FF 21

On March 2, 1992, Cheryl and J.W. signed
an agreement. That agreement estimated
Cheryl's investment in the business at
$60,000 and provided that J.W. would
reimburse her for one-half of that amount
or the sum of $30,000. (The balance of
this Finding is omitted as it is not
applicable to the issue of valuation).

FF 23

Cheryl's evidence about the value of the
Outlaw Saloon was not countered by
evidence from J.W. Cheryl's expert opined
that the total value of the property is
ONE
HUNDRED
FIFTY-FIVE
THOUSAND
($155,000.00) DOLLARS. The Court accepts
this value. Cheryl and J.W. still owe her
uncle FORTY-THREE THOUSAND ($43,000.00)
DOLLARS for the property.

FF 25

The Court finds that the net value of all
of these assets (refers to last sentence
in preceding Finding) is the sum of
$112,000.

FF 26(B)

Most, if not all, of the appreciation in
the value of the business and property is
due to an overall increase in Moab
property values and not to any efforts of
either party to make the business a
success. In fact, bars like The Outlaw
Saloon are not a "growth industry" in
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Moab today. The bar is worth more mainly
because the land on which it sits has
become more valuable due to the economic
changes in the area.
After reviewing the Court's Findings of Fact, it is
next necessary to determine whether any evidence exists
to support the Findings. If such evidence exists, the
Findings should not be disturbed. The parties purchased
the property in the fall of 1990 for a total purchase
price of $80,000 (TT 103-108; Ex 13). The $23,000 used
as the down payment came from Cheryl's sole and separate
property (TT 103-108) as did the remodeling funds (TT
118-119). Cheryl included all of those funds when she
determined

that

she had

invested

$60,000

into the

business and property at the time she entered the written
contract with J.W. which would have allowed him to
purchase one-half of the business and property (TT 129133) . Joe Kingsley testified that the property and the
building had a market value of $155,000 (TT 20, 40). He
went on to testify that the bar itself had very little
value in Moab (TT 31/34) . He provided testimony as to his
experience as a bar owner as well as his involvement as
a real estate agent handling properties where bars were
located

(TT 12-14) . Even with

the

remodeling, the

building was only worth $10,000 (TT 20). Plaintiff's
Response to Defendant's Second Request for Admissions
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also established values for the "business known as The
Outlaw Saloon, including all of the personal property
used in said business, together with the real estate on
which the business is located, and the rights of the
option agreement,'' for total sums that would have netted
approximately $150,000, depending upon the status of
title to the adjacent property and the costs associated
with

same

Plaintiff's

(Add.

C, Admissions

Answers

to

1-3). Additionally,

Defendant's

Second

Set

of

Interrogatories provided in answer to Interrogatory No.
20 that Bob Muir had valued the entire property and
business at between $150,000 to $160,000 and that the
business portion would be worth approximately 6% of one
year's profits which would have placed a very low
valuation on the business portion as the tax returns in
evidence clearly demonstrate that the business had very
little profit (TT 31-34; Exhibits P 16, P 26-30).
Even without reviewing Cheryl's own testimony, the
overview outlined above shows evidence which supports the
Trial Court's Findings of Fact with respect to the
valuation of the enterprise known as The Outlaw Saloon
and its properties. J.W. offered

nothing in rebuttal.

Whether the property might have been sold or not sold at
some point in the future, the Court still needed evidence
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of value at the time of the entry of the Decree of
Divorce (Howell, supra). No Court can be expected to come
up with an equitable division when it cannot establish
a value for the property.
If J.W. had been so concerned about a sale of the
property and felt it could not be valued without a sale,
then he should have raised a motion for the sale of same
at the time of the origin of the case approximately one
year before the actual trial date. J.W. knew the property
was not on the market for sale and he had made no attempt
to request same. He knew when he entered the Courtroom
for the first scheduled trial on December 2, 1994 as well
as the actual trial date of January 3, 1995, that no sale
was pending and yet he was not prepared to offer the
Court one scintilla of evidence to establish a value.
Since the Appellant has failed to marshal all of the
evidence in support of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact
and, despite such evidence, demonstrate that the Findings
were clearly erroneous, the Trial Court's Findings with
respect to the valuation of the enterprise known as The
Outlaw Saloon and its properties should be affirmed.
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IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS IS EQUITABLE
WHEN THE COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THE PARTIES ARE CONSIDERED.
The Trial Court's division of assets was based upon
specific Findings of Fact which are deemed to be accurate
unless proven clearly erroneous. Appellant has failed to
marshal any of the facts that supported the Trial Court's
Findings and thus its division of assets. Instead, his
brief has concentrated on controverted testimony and
self-serving

conclusionary

language

"substantial

contributions", that he

that
spent

he

made

"a very

substantial portion of the marriage working full time or
nearly so", that it was "uncontroverted at trial" that
he devoted a substantial portion of his time to the
business (Appellant's Brief p. 16-17). In reality, the
evidence supports none of those statements.
Cheryl testified that the Defendant rarely worked
more than 20 to 25 hours a week when he was at the
business (TT 59-60). She also testified that he had a
negative impact on the business and often angered people.
Only the Defendant seemed to think that his charming
personality was the basis for the business (TT 250) . The
only uncontroverted facts at trial were the facts that
J.W. came into the marriage with the clothes on his back
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and an 11 year-old car and that he never put one dime
into any asset in this marriage (TT 53-54, 216-217, 264265). Appellant's failure to marshal all the evidence in
support of the Court's Findings should require that this
Court refuse to consider his attack upon the Trial
Court's Findings any further (Hagan, supra).
In the alternative, a review of the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact offers the following with respect to the
issue of the distribution of property:
FF 2

The parties were married on the 25th day
of April, 1987 at Las Vegas, Clark
County, State of Nevada and have been
husband and wife since that date.

FF 3

The parties separated on or about
November, 1993 and have lived separate
and apart since that time.

FF 6

At the time of their marriage, the
Plaintiff (hereinafter called "Cheryl")
was employed at a motel and restaurant in
Moab, Utah and she also owned and
operated a bar in Moab known as the
Outlaw Saloon. The assets of the bar had
been purchased with Cheryl's money. She
operated the bar in a rented building.

FF 7

At the time of the marriage, Cheryl had
invested
about
TWENTY
THOUSAND
($20,000.00) DOLLARS of her money in
establishing the original Outlaw Saloon.
She also had NINE THOUSAND NINETY
($9,090.00) DOLLARS in currency in a
safety deposit box, the sum of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND
FIVE
HUNDRED
TWENTY-FOUR
($15,524.00) DOLLARS in a savings account
at Williamsburg Bank, the sum of NINE
THOUSAND
($9,000.00) DOLLARS in an
individual retirement account, the sum of
31

SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE DOLLARS THIRTY
CENTS ($685.30) in her checking account,
an ounce of gold, motel stock worth
ELEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
($11,445.00) DOLLARS and a TEN THOUSAND
($10,000.00) DOLLAR tax exempt bearer
bond.
FF 8

The Defendant (hereinafter called "J.W.")
brought no assets into the marriage
except a 1975 Thunderbird automobile and
his clothing.

FF 9

At the time of the marriage, Cheryl's
employer was providing meals, lodging and
health insurance for her as a benefit of
her employment. After the marriage, those
benefits continued and were also extended
to J.W. as a benefit of Cheryl's
employment.

FF 10

A few months before the marriage, J.W.
terminated his minimum wage employment as
a custodian for another motel and began
working in the bar. From that point
forward, J.W. worked regularly in the
bar, except for three (3) months when he
attempted to start a business for
himself. He continued to work in the bar
until the parties separated in November
of 1993. Cheryl managed and also worked
in the bar during the same period of
time.

FF 12

On October 2, 1990, Cheryl contracted to
purchase a lot and building from her
uncle
for
TWENTY-THREE
THOUSAND
($23,000.00) DOLLARS down and the balance
of FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ($57,000.00)
DOLLARS to be financed at the rate of ten
(10%) percent per annum over ten (10)
years. J.W. was a party to the contract
but furnished none of the down payment.
The down payment came from the premarital and inherited property of Cheryl.
(Cheryl inherited SIXTEEN THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED ($16,600.00) DOLLARS in cash from
her father's estate in 1988 and THREE
32

THOUSAND
THREE
HUNDRED
SIXTEEN
($3,316.00) DOLLARS in cash plus a right
to ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE ($183.00)
DOLLARS per month for seven (7) years
from her mother's estate in 1991.) On the
same day, the uncle granted Cheryl and
J.W. an option to purchase the adjacent
lot
for TEN THOUSAND
($10,000.00)
DOLLARS. Said option was to be exercised
within one (1) year.
FF 13

Cheryl then began to remodel and improve
the existing building to create a place
to operate her bar. All of the remodeling
funds came from Cheryl's pre-marital or
inherited property.

FF 14

Cheryl had incorporated the Outlaw Saloon
in 1988. She was its sole shareholder
and, in exchange for the shares, she had
conveyed all of the property and assets
of the original Outlaw Saloon into said
corporation. Throughout the marriage, she
has remained the sole owner of all of the
shares of said corporation.

FF 15

Cheryl loaned the remodeling funds to the
corporation from her sole and separate
property. Cheryl claims to have loaned a
total
of
FIFTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND
($57,000.00) DOLLARS to the corporation
for the remodeling. However, the 1991
corporate tax returns list stockholder
loans to the corporation of only TWENTYFIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($25,500.00)
DOLLARS as of the end of 1991. Cheryl has
presented no other documentation of that
investment. Cheryl has shown that she
sold her motel stock in 1991, presumably
to finance the remodeling effort. At the
time of its sale, the motel stock was
worth FIFTEEN THOUSAND
($15,000.00)
DOLLARS.

FF 16

J.W. and Cheryl filed joint tax returns
for 1987 through 1992 and Cheryl filed
corporate tax returns from 1989 through
1992. Every tax return showed Cheryl as
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the sole proprietor of the bar before its
incorporation and the sole owner of the
corporation after its creation. Cheryl is
the only shareholder in the corporation
although J.W. served as a director and a
nominal secretary.
FF 18

The new bar included living quarters for
Cheryl and J.W. During the course of the
marriage,
J.W.'s
meals,
lodging,
insurance and transportation needs were
provided as a condition of Cheryl's
employment or in conjunction with the
operation of the business. J.W. received
no separate compensation until 1989 for
his work in the business.

FF 21

On March 2, 1992, Cheryl and J.W. signed
an agreement. That agreement estimated
Cheryl's investment in the business at
SIXTY THOUSAND ($60,000.00) DOLLARS and
provided that J.W. would reimburse her
for one-half of that amount or the sum of
THIRTY THOUSAND ($30,000.00) DOLLARS. The
agreement also divided responsibility for
the operation of the bar, set salaries
for Cheryl and J.W., and outlined a means
for preserving the marital union. J.W.
did not make more than the first few
payments under this agreement and did not
sell his trailer and pay over the
proceeds as he had agreed. He explained
this breach as a natural consequence of
the failure of the corporation to pay all
of the salary provided by the agreement.

FF 22

The 1992 agreement is not useful as a
legal document because it was breached by
both parties. Agreements between the
parties to a marriage are not usually
binding on a divorce court. (Antenuptial
and postnuptial
agreements
can be
enforceable in Utah but only under
conditions that this agreement made no
effort to meet.) The agreement is most
helpful as an expression of the states of
mind of Cheryl and J.W. at a time when
the pre-divorce legal posturing had not
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yet begun. The agreement reflects a
recognition by both parties that the bar
has been a joint marital venture but that
Cheryl alone had made a substantial
financial investment in that venture.
Based
on
this
agreement
and
the
circumstances outlined above, the Court
finds that the bar is a marital asset but
that equitable division will require that
Cheryl receive more than one-half of this
marital asset.
FF 25

The Court finds that the net value of all
of these assets is the sum of ONE HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND ($112,000.00) DOLLARS.
Cheryl had invested SIXTY THOUSAND
($60,000.00) DOLLARS of her separate premarital or inherited property in the
business as of March 1993. The Court
finds that she is entitled to recover all
of that investment. The Court must then
determine an equitable distribution for
the remaining value of the property.

FF 26

The usual presumption is that marital
property should be divided equally after
pre-marital contributions are returned;
however, there are two (2) facts that
suggest the need for a different division
in this case;
A.

Cheryl is fifty-one (51) years old.
J.W. is thirty-eight (38) years old.
Cheryl has also suffered an injury
to her leg that seriously limits her
ability to work. She has a greater
need for marital assets than does
J.W.

B.

Most,
if
not
all,
of
the
appreciation in the value of the
business and property is due to an
overall increase in Moab property
values and not to any efforts of
either party to make the business a
success. In fact, bars like the
Outlaw Saloon are not a "growth
industry" in Moab today. The bar is
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worth more mainly because the land
on which it sits has become more
valuable due to economic changes in
the area.
FF 27

The Court finds that one-fourth (1/4) of
the increased equity or the sum of
THIRTEEN THOUSAND ($13,000.00) DOLLARS
should be awarded to J.W. as his
equitable portion of the property. The
remainder of the increased equity is
awarded to Cheryl.

FF 28

J.W. concedes that there is no other
marital asset, except the portion of
Cheryl's IRA accumulated during the
marriage.
Cheryl
contributed
EIGHT
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED ($8,900.00) DOLLARS
to her IRA during the marriage and those
contributions had accumulated interest at
an average rate of six point five (6.5%)
percent per annum for an average of four
(4) years. The Court finds that the value
of the marital portion of the IRA is
ELEVEN THOUSAND ($11,000.00) DOLLARS.
One-half of this amount should be awarded
to J.W.

FF 29

J.W.fs total property award (THIRTEEN
THOUSAND ($13,000.00) DOLLARS of the
increased equity in the property and FIVE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($5,500.00) DOLLARS
from the increased value of the IRA) is
the sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
($18,500.00) DOLLARS. Said property award
shall bear interest at the rate of seven
(7%) percent per annum from January 1,
1995. The Court finds that Cheryl does
not have the capacity to readily borrow
said sum of money and, therefore, she
will need to make payments on the
property award. The Court finds that the
sum of approximately TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
($250.00) DOLLARS per month would allow
a payoff of the property settlement over
a period of approximately eight (8)
years. Said monthly payments shall
commence on February 1, 1995. As long as
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the payments are current, no execution
shall issue but J.W. shall be entitled to
a lien on the real estate under the bar
in the amount of the property award until
same has been fully paid, together with
interest thereon.
Given the express Findings of Fact of the Trial
Court, it was J. W.fs job to marshal all of the evidence
and, despite the evidence, demonstrate that the Court's
Findings were clearly erroneous. A brief survey of the
record demonstrates a considerable amount of evidence to
support each of the Findings. Most importantly, there is
evidence

to

support

the

Findings

of

value

and

distribution. Once the Court established the value of The
Outlaw Saloon with its adjacent properties at $155,000
minus the obligation thereon at $43,000, the Court found
a net value of $112,000. All of the evidence and
documentation supported the fact that Cheryl had invested
at least $60,000 of her separate pre-marital or inherited
property into the business (Add. D, Ex. P-4) and that
J.W. had never contributed a dime by way of any premarital or inherited property (TT 53-54, 216-217). The
Court

found that Cheryl

should recover all of her

investment. The remaining equity was the sum of $52,000.
The Court then reasoned that the usual presumption
was that marital property should be divided equally after
the pre-marital contributions were returned
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(FF 26).

Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). In the
case at bar, however, the Court found that there were two
factors which suggested that a different division was
appropriate: (1) The comparative physical conditions of
the

parties

and

(2)

The

basis

for

the

increased

appreciation in the asset being divided• First, the Court
made note of the fact that Cheryl was substantially older
than J.W. Cheryl was 51 and J.W. was 38 years old. Cheryl
had suffered an injury to her leg which seriously limited
her ability to work, while J.W. was in excellent health.
The Court found that Cheryl had a greater need for
marital assets than did J.W. (FF 26A) . Those Findings
were supported by the evidence. Cheryl testified as to
her age, her serious injury and inability to stand for
long periods of time. She testified about her past work
history and the impact of her injury on her ability to
perform her normal work (TT 62-63) . Her prospects for
employment outside of the bar did not appear good (TT
205). By contrast, 38-year-old J.W. had gained employment
at the highest rate of pay he had ever earned, namely,
$6.00 per hour (TT 275). That was up from $4.00 per hour
at the time he came into the marriage (TT 271) . His
vigorous

personal

appearance

on

the

witness

stand

evidenced his health and his ability to earn. All of
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these facts were before the Court and provided a basis
for the Court's Findings.
Additionally, Joe Kingsley had testified about the
appreciated value of the property from the time it was
purchased in 1991 for $80,000 to the time of the divorce
when it was valued at $155,000. He testified that most,
if not all, of the increased value of the property was
due to the overall increase in property values in Moab
due to the economy (TT 31). He testified that bars did
not do well but that the property itself had appreciated
substantially

due

to

the

economy

(TT 31-34).

That

evidence was uncontroverted. It also provides a basis for
the Court's Finding of Fact 26B.
Because of those factors, the Court found that it
would not be equitable to divide equally the appreciation
associated with The Outlaw Saloon. In Finding of Fact 27,
the Court found that 25% of the marital equity was the
sum of $13,000 and should be awarded to J.W. ($112,000 $60,000 returned to Cheryl = $52,000 x .25% = $13,000)
and the remaining 75% of the marital equity should be
awarded to Cheryl ($52,000 x .75 = $39,000).
The Court then went on to value the only other
marital asset, namely, the marital portion of Cheryl's
IRA

account. The uncontroverted
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testimony

at trial

established that the marital portion of the IRA account
together with interest was $11,000. The Court found that
one-half of that amount, namely, $5,500 should be awarded
to J.W.
J.W. was awarded a property interest for his onehalf of the IRA and his one-fourth of the marital equity
in the Outlaw Saloon which

totaled $18,500. The evidence

supported Cheryl's need for additional assets and the
fact that her original investment caused most of the
appreciated

value

in

the

business.

The

Court's

distribution cannot be found to be clearly erroneous nor
can it be found to be inequitable and, therefore, the
findings of the Trial Court should be affirmed.
V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN AWARDING THE APPELLEE
THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE OPTION AGREEMENT.
The testimony at trial established that the parties
signed

an Option Agreement

with

Cheryl's

uncle to

purchase an adjacent lot for the sum of $10,000 on
October 2, 1990 (FF 12). The option had to be exercised
within one year (FF 12). With respect to the value of the
option, if any, the Court entered the following Findings
of Fact:
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FF 19

On October 2, 1991, when the opinion
to purchase the adjacent lot was due
to
expire, Cheryl decided to
exercise the option and contacted
her uncle for that purpose. Her
uncle rejected her tender and told
her that she and J.W. would do
better to put their money into a
home. The record reflects no further
effort to acquire the adjacent lot
until October 25, 1993 when Cheryl's
lawyer wrote a letter to Cheryl's
uncle in an attempt to persuade him
to go through with the sale. That
effort failed and Cheryl decided to
abandon the effort. A portion of the
Saloon building actually sits on the
adjacent lot and a significant
portion of the parking lot is
located on part of said parcel.
Cheryl presently pays her uncle ONE
HUNDRED ($100•00) DOLLARS per month
for the right to occupy said
property
but
has
no
written
agreement with him.

FF 24

Although either Cheryl or J.W. may
initially have had a chance of
legally compelling the uncle to
consummate the sale of the adjacent
lot, prospects of success have been
dimmed by their failure to pursue
their claim. The Court finds that
their claim to the adjacent lot has
little or no value. Because Cheryl
has the best chance of being able to
deal with her uncle for the adjacent
lot, the Court finds that it is most
appropriate that the business, the
real estate, the claim to the
adjacent lot, if any, be awarded to
Cheryl.

The Findings of Fact of the Trial Court should be
affirmed unless they are clearly erroneous. J.W. is
required

to marshal

all of
41

the evidence

from the

transcript in support of the Trial Court's Findings of
Fact. He has ignored that responsibility. This Court
should refuse to consider any further attack on the Trial
Court's Finding because of that failure (Hagan, supra).
In Arguendo/ a brief review of a portion of the
trial testimony will indicate the justification for the
Trial Court's Findings. First, the parties have no
interest in the real property other than a "claim" or
cause of action based upon an Option Agreement entered
on October 2, 1990 (FF 19 and 24). J.W. talks about the
property as though he was in possession of same and
claims a value of at least $25,000. The testimony at
trial established that J.W. had abandoned any claim for
enforcement of the Option. He had never hired an attorney
to even render an opinion much less enforce the Option
Agreement (TT 219). He presented no expert witness at
trial to establish the merit of any alleged claim. He
never initiated a law suit to establish what, if any,
legal claim he might have on the property (TT 219-220).
On the date the Option contract was due and the sum of
$10,000 had to be paid, J.W. had no money whatsoever from
which he could have paid for the Option (TT 273).
By

contrast, Cheryl

had

actually

attempted to

exercise the Option on October 2, 1991 (TT 110-116). She
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did have funds from her own separate monies with which
to have exercised the Option (TT 110-116). If she had
been able to exercise the Option, she would have used
sole and separate property to do so and, therefore, J.W.
would not have had a claim anyway. When the Cheryl's
uncle refused the tender, Cheryl waited over two years
to seek any legal advice (TT 110-116). In August of 1993,
she did consult with an attorney on her behalf only (TT
110-116).
likelihood

Counsel
of

advised

success

and

Cheryl
the

of

the

limited

considerable

cost

associated with trying to enforce the Option (TT 110-116;
218-220) . Cheryl went home and discussed the matter with
J.W.

who was unwilling and unable to provide any funds

to help enforce the contract (TT 114-116). Cheryl took
no further steps to enforce the Option (TT 219). There
is no other testimony in the record. There is nothing
whatsoever to establish a legal basis to believe that the
parties have any valid claim for enforcement of the
Option and the Trial Court so found (FF 24). The Court
went on to find that if there was some dim hope of
success, it should be awarded to Cheryl (FF 24) as she
had the best ability to deal with her uncle and also had
a

building

sitting

on

a portion

of

the property.

Additionally, she had a Rental Agreement which authorized
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her to use the property and for which she was paying
monthly consideration.
Given the complete lack of evidence presented by
J.W., it is not unreasonable to assume nor inaccurate for
the Trial Court to find that the Option had little or no
value. Since the Appellant failed to marshal all of the
evidence in support of the Trial Court's Findings, and
despite such evidence, demonstrate that the Trial Court's
Findings were clearly erroneous, the Trial Court should
be affirmed with respect to its award of the cause of
action for the Option Agreement.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has attacked the failure of the Trial
Court to impose sanctions or order the sale of The Outlaw
Saloon claiming that he was surprised by the Appellee's
desires not to sell the saloon at the time of trial.
Since Appellant

failed

to prepare

and present

any

independent testimony on valuation of assets which was
necessary for a determination of the issues at trial and
since Appellee's "desires" concerning a possible sale of
the business were irrelevant and immaterial to the issues
before the Court and since the Appellant never requested
a continuance, sanctions, penalties or a sale of property
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before or during the Trial, there was no reason for the
Trial Court to consider such a course of action.
Appellant has attacked the Trial Court's Findings
with respect to the valuation of The Outlaw Saloon and
the

award

of

the

cause

of

action

for

the Option

Agreement. In each instance, the Court entered specific
Findings of Fact. Appellant did not marshal all of the
evidence that would have supported the Court's Findings
of Fact but, instead, ignored the supporting evidence and
pointed to his own disputed evidence. Rule 52(a) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, requires the Appellant to
marshal all of the evidence and then demonstrate, despite
such evidence, that the findings of the Court are clearly
erroneous. The Appellant has failed in that burden of
proof and, therefore, the Trial Court's decision and the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce entered thereon should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of November,

J<$pK PAPPAS WHITE
Attorney for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two (2)
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE, by posting in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, on this 6th day of November, 1995 to the
following:
JAMES C. LEWIS
George S. Diumenti, II
DIUMENTI & LEWIS
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010

DME PAP PAS WHITE:
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ADDENDUM A
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree of Divorce

" W 'GIMAL

JOANE PAPPAS WHITE # 3 4 4 5
Attorney Defendant
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
4 7 5 E a s t Main S t r e e t
P r i c e , Utah 84501
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 637-0177

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County
FILED

FFR 1 7

',4135

CLERK Or THE COURT

BY.

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHERYL MONDERS,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
Vs.
KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS,

Civil No.

9447-8

Defendant.
The above-en titled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Court on the 3rd day of January, 1995, the Honorable
LYLE R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was
personally present and accompanied by her attorney JOANE PAPPAS
WHITE. Defendant was personally present and accompanied by his
attorney JAMES C. LEWIS. The Court received sworn testimony and
exhibits and took the matter under advisement. Having been fully
advised in the premises, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and
now, finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff was an actual and bona fide residen

of Grand County, State of Utah, and had been for more than thre<
(3) months immediately

next prior to the commencement

of this

action,
2.

The parties hereto were married on the 25th day of

April, 1987 at Las Vegas, Clark County, State of Nevada and have
been husband and wife since that date.
3.

The parties hereto separated on or about November,

1993 and have lived separate and apart since that time.
4.

The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have

developed between the parties which makes it impossible for them to
maintain

a marital

relationship

and,

therefore,

the

Plaintiff

should be granted a Decree of Divorce terminating her marriage to
the Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
5.

There have been no children born as the issue of

this marriage and^ none are expected.
6.
(hereinafter

At

the

called

time

of

"Cheryl")

their
was

marriage,

employed

at

the
a

Plaintiff
motel

and

restaurant in Moab, Utah and she also owned and operated a bar in
Moab known as the Outlaw Saloon. The assets of the bar had been
purchased with Cheryl's money. She operated the bar in a rented
building.
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7.
about

TWENTY

At the time of the marriage, Cheryl had invested
THOUSAND

($20,000.00)

DOLLARS

of her money

in

establishing the original Outlaw Saloon. She also had NINE THOUSAND
NINETY ($9,090.00) DOLLARS in currency in a safety deposit box, the
sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR

($15,524.00)

DOLLARS in a savings account at Williamsburg Bank, the sum of NINE
THOUSAND ($9,000.00) DOLLARS in an individual retirement account,
the sum of SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE DOLLARS THIRTY CENTS ($685.30)
in her checking account, an ounce of gold, motel stock worth ELEVEN
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE ($11,445.00) DOLLARS and a TEN
THOUSAND ($10,000.00) DOLLAR tax exempt bearer bond.
8.

The Defendant (hereinafter called "J.W.") brought no

assets into the marriage except a 1975 Thunderbird automobile and
his clothing.
9.

At the time of the marriage, Cheryl's employer was

providing meals, lodging and health insurance for her as a benefit
of her employment. After the marriage, those benefits continued and
were also extended to J.W. as a benefit of Cheryl's employment.
10.

A few months before the marriage, J.W. terminated

his minimum wage employment as a custodian for another motel and
began working in the bar. From that point forward, J.W. worked
regularly in the bar, except for three (3) months when he attempted
to start a business for himself. He continued to work in the bar
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until the parties separated in November of 1993. Cheryl managed and
also worked in the bar during the same period of time.
11.
restaurant

In late 1990, Cheryl became aware that the motel and

where

she

worked

were

scheduled

to be

torn

down.

Construction of a new motel would require the use of the space
where she had been operating the bar. She, therefore, began looking
for another location.
12.

On October 2, 1990, Cheryl contracted to purchase a

lot building from her uncle for TWENTY-THREE THOUSAND

($23,000.00)

DOLLARS down and the balance of FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND

($57,000.00)

DOLLARS to be financed at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum
over ten (10) years. J.W. was a party to the contract but furnished
none of the down payment. The down payment came from the premarital and inherited property of Cheryl. (Cheryl inherited SIXTEEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED ($16,600.00) DOLLARS in cash from her father's
estate in 1988 and THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTEEN ($3,316.00)
DOLLARS in cash plus a right to ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE

($183.00)

DOLLARS per month for seven (7) years from her mother's estate in
1991.) On the same day, the uncle granted Cheryl and J.W. an option
to purchase the adjacent lot for TEN THOUSAND ($10,000.00) DOLLARS.
Said option was to be exercised within one (1) year.
13.

Cheryl

then

began

to

remodel

and

improve

the

existing building to create a place to operate her bar. All of the
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remodeling

funds

came

from

Cheryl's

pre-marital

or

inherited

property.
14.

Cheryl had incorporated the Outlaw Saloon in 1988.

She was its sole shareholder and, in exchange for the shares, she
had conveyed all of the property and assets of the original Outlaw
Saloon into said corporation. Throughout the marriage, she has
remained the sole owner of all of the shares of said corporation.
15.

Cheryl

loaned

the

remodeling

funds

to

the

corporation from her sole and separate property. Cheryl claims to
have loaned a total of FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ($57,000.00) DOLLARS to
the corporation for the remodeling. However, the 1991 corporate tax
returns list stockholder loans to the corporation of only TWENTYFIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($25,500.00) DOLLARS as of the end of
1991.

Cheryl

has

presented

no

other

documentation

of

that

investment. Cheryl has shown that she sold her motel stock in 1991,
presumably to finance the remodeling effort. At the time of its
sale,

the motel

stock was worth

FIFTEEN THOUSAND

($15,000.00)

DOLLARS.
16.
through

J.W. and Cheryl filed joint tax returns for 1987

1992 and Cheryl filed

corporate tax returns from

1989

through 1992. Every tax return showed Cheryl as the sole proprietor
of the bar before its incorporation and the sole owner of the
corporation after its creation. Cheryl is the only shareholder in

5

the corporation although J.W. served as a director and a nomin;
secretary.
17.

The Outlaw Saloon ceased operation at its origins

location in August of 1991 and the new bar opened in October c
1991.
18.

The new bar included living quarters for Cheryl an

J.W. During the course of the marriage, J.W.'s meals, lodging
insurance and transportation needs were provided as a condition o
Cheryl's employment or in conjunction with the operation of th
business. J.W. received no separate compensation until 1989 for hi.
work in the business.
19.

On October 2, 1991, when the option to purchase th*

adjacent lot was due to expire, Cheryl decided to exercise the
option and contacted her uncle for that purpose. Her uncle rejectee
her tender and told her that she and J.W. would do better to put
their money into a home. The record reflects no further effort to
acquire the adjacent lot until October 25, 1993 when Cheryl's
lawyer wrote a letter to Cheryl's uncle in an attempt to persuade
him "to go through with the sale. That effort failed and Cheryl
decided to abandon the effort. A portion of the Saloon building
actually sits on the adjacent lot and a significant portion of the
parking lot is located on part of said parcel. Cheryl presently
pays her uncle ONE HUNDRED ($100.00) DOLLARS per month for the
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right to occupy said property but has no written agreement with
him.
20.

After

their

separation

in November,

1993, the

parties entered into a struggle for control of the bar and the
living quarters therein. At the time of trial, Cheryl had prevailed
and was living in and managing the bar without any help from J.W.
21.

On

March

2,

1992, Cheryl

and

J.W.

signed an

agreement. That agreement estimated Cheryl's investment in the
business at SIXTY THOUSAND ($60,000.00) DOLLARS and provided that
J.W. would reimburse her for one-half of that amount or the sum of
THIRTY THOUSAND ($30,000.00) DOLLARS. The agreement also divided
responsibility for the operation of the bar, set salaries for
Cheryl and J.W., and outlined a means for preserving the marital
union. J.W. did not make more than the first few payments under
this agreement and did not sell his trailer and pay over the
proceeds as he had agreed. He explained this breach as a natural
consequence of the failure of the corporation to pay all of the
salary provided by the agreement.
22.

The 1992 agreement is not useful as a legal document

because it was breached by both parties. Agreements between the
parties to a marriage are not usually binding on a divorce court.
(Antenuptial and postnuptial agreements can be enforceable in Utah
but only under conditions that this agreement made no effort to
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meet.) The agreement is most helpful as an expression of the states
of mind of Cheryl and J.W. at a time when the pre-divorce legal
posturing had not yet begun. The agreement reflects a recognition
by both parties that the bar has been a joint marital venture but
that Cheryl alone had made a substantial financial investment in
that

venture.

Based

on

this

agreement

and

the

circumstances

outlined above, the Court finds that the bar is a marital asset but
that equitable division will require that Cheryl receive more than
one-half of this marital asset.
23.

Cheryl's evidence about the value of the Outlaw

Saloon was not countered by evidence from J.W. Cheryl's expert
opined that the total value of the property is ONE HUNDRED FIFTYFIVE THOUSAND ($155,000.00) DOLLARS. The Court accepts this value.
Cheryl

and

J.W.

still

owe

her

uncle

FORTY-THREE

THOUSAND

($43,000.00) DOLLARS for the property.
24.

Although either Cheryl or J.W. may initially have

had a chance of legally compelling the uncle to consummate the sale
of the adjacent lot, prospects of success have been dimmed by their
failure to pursue their claim. The Court finds that their claim to
the adjacent lot has little or no value. Because Cheryl has the
best chance of being able to deal with her uncle for the adjacent
lot, the Court finds that it is most appropriate that the business,
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the real estate, the claim to the adjacent lot, if any, be awarded
to Cheryl.
25.

The Court finds that the net value of all of these

assets is the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND

($112,000.00)

DOLLARS. Cheryl had invested SIXTY THOUSAND ($60,000.00) DOLLARS of
her separate pre-marital or inherited property in the business as
of March 1993. The Court finds that she is entitled to recover all
of that investment. The Court must then determine an equitable
distribution for the remaining value of the property.
26.

The usual presumption is that marital property

should be divided equally after pre-marital contributions are
returned; however, there are two (2) facts that suggest the need
for a different division in this case:
A.

Cheryl is fifty-one (51) years old. J.W. is

thirty-eight (38) years old. Cheryl has also suffered an injury to
her leg that seriously limits her ability to work. She has a
greater need for marital assets than does J.W.
B.

Most, if not all, of the appreciation in the

value of the business and property is due to an overall increase in
Moab property values and not to any efforts of either party to make
the business a success. In fact, bars like the Outlaw Saloon are
not a "growth industry" in Moab today. The bar is worth more mainly
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because the land on which it sits has become more valuable due t
economic changes in the area.
27.

The

Court finds

that one-fourth

increased equity or the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND

(1/4) of

th

($13,000.00

DOLLARS should be awarded to J.W. as his equitable portion of th<
property. The remainder of the increased equity is awarded t<
Cheryl.
28.

J.W. concedes that there is no other marital asset,

except the portion of Cheryl's IRA accumulated during the marriage.
Cheryl contributed EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED ($8,900.00) DOLLARS
to her IRA during

the marriage and

those contributions

had

accumulated interest at an average rate of six point five (6.5%)
percent per annum for an average of four (4) years. The Court finds
that the value of the marital portion of the IRA is ELEVEN THOUSAND
($11,000.00) DOLLARS. One-half of this amount should be awarded to
J.W.
29.

J.W.'s total property award

(THIRTEEN

THOUSAND

($13,000.00) DOLLARS of the increased equity in the property and
FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($5,500.00) DOLLARS from the increased
value of the IRA) is the sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
($18,500.00) DOLLARS. Said property award shall bear interest at
the rate of seven (7%) percent per annum from January 1, 1995. The
Court finds that Cheryl does not have the capacity to readily
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borrow said sum of money and, therefore, she will need to make
payments on the property award. The Court finds that the sum of
approximately TWO HUNDRED FIFTY ($250.00) DOLLARS per month would
allow a payoff of the property settlement over a period of
approximately eight (8) years. Said monthly payments shall commence
on February 1, 1995. As long as the payments are current, no
execution shall issue but J.W. shall be entitled to a lien on the
real estate under the bar in the amount of the property award until
same has been fully paid, together with interest thereon.
30.

Neither party has requested alimony during the

proceeding and the Court awards no alimony herein.
31.

Each party is ordered to bear his or her own Court

costs and attorney's fees in this matter.
32.

The Plaintiff has sustained the allegations of her

Complaint by adequate evidence.
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact
now concludes as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The

Plaintiff

is

granted

a

divorce

from

the

Defendant.
2.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain real and

personal property during this marriage and said property is awarded
as follows:

ll

A.

The Plaintiff is awarded the Outlaw Saloon bar

together with all of its assets, and the building and property
where same is located, free and clear of all claims of the
Defendant with the exception that the Defendant shall be entitled
to a lien against the real property until the property settlement
awarded to the Defendant has been fully paid. Said property is
located

in Moab, Grand

County,

State

of Utah

and

is

more

particularly described as follows:
BEG 6 RD N & 150 FT W OF NE CORNER BLK 25 MSS, W 67.5 FT,
N 243 FT, E 67 4 FT, S 243 FT TO BEG. ALT # 26-21-1-93.
ACRES; 0.38
The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the
outstanding indebtedness to her uncle, Clair Tangren, for the
underlying obligation on said property and hold the Defendant
harmless therefrom.
B.

The Plaintiff is awarded any claim or chose-in-

action which the parties may have, free and clear of all claims of
the Defendant, against the Plaintiff's uncle Clair Tangren with
respect to the adjacent lot located in Moab, Grand County, State of
Utah and more particularly described as follows:
BEG 99 feet North and 193 feet East of the Northwest
Corner Block 25 MSS, thence North 243 feet; thence East
50 feet; thence South 243 feet; thence West 50 feet to
the place of beginning. Together with all improvements
thereon and appurtenances thereunto belonging.
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C.

The Defendant is awarded a property settlement

in the total sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($18,500.00)
DOLLARS, bearing interest at the rate of seven (7%) percent per
annum

from January

1,

1995 until

fully paid.

Said property

settlement shall be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant at the
rate of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO DOLLARS TWENTY-THREE CENTS ($252.23)
per month commencing February 1, 1995 and continuing each and every
month thereafter for a period of eight (8) years or until said
property settlement together with accumulated interest thereon has
been fully paid. Said property settlement shall be a lien on the
real property located under the Outlaw Saloon bar until the
property award has been fully paid. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay
said property settlement to the Defendant under the terms and
conditions outlined herein. As long as said payments are current,
no execution on the property

settlement shall issue but the

Defendant shall receive a lien on said real property as provided
for herein.
D.

The Plaintiff is awarded all of her IRA account

free and clear of all claims of the Defendant.
E.

Each party is awarded his or her pre-marital

property free and clear of all claims of the other.
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F.

Each party is awarded those items of marital

personal property in his or her possession as of the date of trial
on January 3, 1995.
3.

Neither party is awarded any alimony.

4.

Each party is ordered to pay his or her own Court

costs and attorney's fees in this matter.
DATED this

day of

iZh

LYl£-"R. ANDERSON
District Court Judge
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SCVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County

JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney Defendant
FILED prq < 7 ;j,a5
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

]i

CHERYL MONDERS,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
Vs.

]

KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS,

]> Civil No.

9447-8

Defendant.
The above-en titled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Court on the 3rd day of January, 1995, the Honorable
LYLE R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was
personally present and accompanied by her attorney JOANE PAPPAS
WHITE. Defendant was personally present and accompanied by his
attorney JAMES C. LEWIS. The Court received sworn testimony and
exhibits and took the matter under advisement. Having been fully
advised in the premises, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and
having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.
Defendant.

The

Plaintiff

is

granted

a

divorce

from

the

2.

The parties hereto have accumulated certain real ai

personal property during this marriage and said property is awards
as follows:
A.

The Plaintiff is awarded the Outlaw Saloon bs

together with all of its assets, and the building and propert
where same is located, free and clear of all claims of th
Defendant with the exception that the Defendant shall be entitle
to a lien against the real property until the property settlemen
awarded to the Defendant has been fully paid. Said property it
located

in Moab, Grand

County,

State

of Utah

and

is more

particularly described as follows:
BEG 6 RD N & 150 FT W OF NE CORNER BLK 25 MSS, W 67.5 FT,
N 243 FT, E 67 4 FT, S 243 FT TO BEG. ALT # 26-21-1-93.
ACRES; 0.38
Together with all improvements thereon and appurtenances
thereunto belonging.
The

Plaintiff

is

ordered

to

assume

and

pay

the

outstanding indebtedness to her uncle, Clair Tangren, for the
underlying obligation on said property and hold the Defendant
harmless therefrom.
B.

The Plaintiff is awarded any claim or chose-in-

action which the parties may have, free and clear of all claims of
the Defendant, against the Plaintiffs uncle Clair Tangren with
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respect to the adjacent lot located in Moab, Grand County, State of
Utah and more particularly described as follows:
BEG 99 feet North and 193 feet East of the Northwest
Corner Block 25 MSS, thence North 243 feet; thence East
50 feet; thence South 243 feet; thence West 50 feet to
the place of beginning. Together with all improvements
thereon and appurtenances thereunto belonging.
C.

The Defendant is awarded a property settlement

in the total sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ($18,500.00)
DOLLARS, bearing interest at the rate of seven (7%) percent per
annum from January

1,

1995 until fully paid. Said property

settlement shall be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant at the
rate of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO DOLLARS TWENTY-THREE CENTS ($252.23)
per month commencing February 1, 1995 and continuing each and every
month thereafter for a period of eight (8) years or until said
property settlement together with accumulated interest thereon has
been fully paid. Said property settlement shall be a lien on the
real property located under the Outlaw Saloon bar until the
property award has been fully paid. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay
said property settlement to the Defendant under the terms and
conditions outlined herein. As long as said payments are current,
no execution on the property

settlement shall issue but the

Defendant shall receive a lien on said real property as provided
for herein.
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D.

The Plaintiff is awarded all of her IRA account

free and clear of all claims of the Defendant,
E.

Each party is awarded his or her pre-marital

property free and clear of all claims of the other.
F.

Each party is awarded those items of marital

personal property in his or her possession as of the date of trial
on January 3, 1995,
3.

Neither party is awarded any alimony.

4,

Each party is ordered to pay his or her own Court

costs and attorney's fees in this matter.
DATED this W-

day of

J-tvtT^g ^c

IXtg/K. ANDERSON
District Court Judge

4

, 1995.

ADDENDUM B
Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's
Second Set of Interrogatories, Document Requests

JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHERYL HONDERS,
Plaintiff,
Vs.
KENNETH WAYNE NONDERS,

) PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO
]1 DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF
]| INTERROGATORIES, DOCUMENT
| REQUESTS
]

Defendant.

Civil NO. 9447-8

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn upon
oath# and hereby responds to Defendant's Interrogatories and
Request for Production of Docu&t^t&, pursuant to Rules 33 and
34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:
INTERROGATORY N O . 1

Describe in detail

all compensation you have received from the business known as
The Outlaw Saloon during the

calendar year

1994•

(In

responding to this interrogatory, Plaintiff should include all
direct and indirect compensation, including personal payments
made on Plaintiff's behalf by the business).
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

With the exception

of February 1994, I was injured and not able to be here.
Housing is provided by the Outlaw Saloon inc., for a night

watchman,

I elected to be here so as to not hire outside

help.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2

Indicate all of the

periods during the calendar year 1994 during which you were
unable to work due to the injury to your knee cap.

Also

indicate all of the periods in 1994 during which you have
worked as a manager or a bartender of the Outlaw Saloon.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2: I was and still am
the owner and manager of the Outlaw Saloon Inc., since its
inception in 1986 to date*

I was off work and still am as a

bartender from January 12, 1994 and to date have not been
released.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3

Please

indicate

whether or not your doctors have released you to work, and,
if so, indicate the date of such release, and whether you are
willing to produce a copy of said release.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3:
released back to work.
closed by Dr. Patterson.

I have not been

As of October 4, 1994 my case was
I am not signing any release until

I try bartending which will be the end of November 1994.
INTERROGATORY NO, 4 Describe all workers
compensation benefits you have received as a result of your
injury during the 1994 calendar year, and, in that regard,
indicate the following:
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(a)
such

the monthly payments received by you; the date

payments

commenced;

and

the

date

such

payments

terminated, if applicable;
(b)

the name of the workers compensation

fund

paying such benefits.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO- 4:
(a)

$167.00 per week; January

March 24, 1994.
(b)

13, 1994 through

See attached Compensation Agreement.

Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah.
INTERROGATORY NO, 5

Indicate whether or

not any of the assets contained in your safety deposit box at
First Security Bank of Utah, Moab, Utah, 84532, #470, as
identified in Plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory Number 14
of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, were acquired
during the course of the marriage.

If so, identify what

assets were acquired during the marriage.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO, 5:

A title to the

Outlaw Saloon Inc., Ford 1984 Ford Escort, bought with a part
of my inheritance money 1988, two (2) birth certificates for
my children (acquired by a former marriage), one (1) Kougann,
acquired in 1982 and miscellaneous photos.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6
specificity

the

"miscellaneous

Identify

items"

identified

with
in

subparagraph (a) in Plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory Number
14 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories.
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6J

A title to the

Outlaw Saloon Inc., Ford 1984 Pord Escort, bought with a part
of my inheritance money 1988, two (2) birth certificates for
my children (acquired by a former marriage), one (1) Kougann,
acquired in 1982 and miscellaneous photosINTERROGATORV NO. 7

Indicate all of the

dates you have lived in the apartment unit located on the real
property on which the Outlaw Saloon is located, since the
separation of the parties.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

I did live in the

caretakers apartment alone starting November 9, 1993 until
January 14, 1994.

I was then thrown out of my bar and house

on a fraudulent ex-parte order and did not get back into the
apartment until March 15, 1994. I have been there ever since.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8

Indicate whether you

have personally paid for each and every personal expense
identified

in

response

to

Interrogatory

Number

16

of

Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, or whether some or
any of those expenses have been paid by the Outlaw Saloon.
If the Outlaw Saloon has paid some of such expenses, please
identify which expenses it has paid.
ANSWER TO* INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

Rent

was

furnished by the Outlaw Saloon Inc., in the caretaker's
apartment, but if I chose not to stay another party would have
been paid*

Lights, water and laundry facilities are included

in the apartment for the service of caretaking.
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All other

expenses are paid for personally.

The Plaintiff is still

paying for the Defendant's medical insurance.
INTERROGATORY NO, 9 Indicate the original
purchase price of the shares of Canyonlands Cafe and Motel
identified by Plaintiff in response to Interrogatory Number
25 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO* 9

In June of 1986,

ten (io) months prior to my marriage, I purchased shares in
the Canyonlands Motel and Cafe Inc.

This stock was owned by

me prior to my marriage and was sold for FIFTEEN THOUSAND
($15,000.00) DOLLARS and was deposited into the Outlaw Saloon
Inc., checking account for the purpose of building the present
Outlaw Saloon Inc., #2. The original purchase price was TEN
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE ($10,545,00) DOLLARS which
has already been answered in the first set of Interrogatories •
INTERROGATORY NO. 10 Indicate the source
of funds for the purchase of the shares of canyonlands cafe
and Motel.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO* 10

purchased

prior

to my marriage.

The

Plaintiff

stock

was

objects to

providing information on the source of the funds as the shares
were premarital.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11 Please describe what
you mean by your response of "recalled

1988-approx," in

response to Interrogatory Number 25 of Defendants's First Set
of Interrogatories.
5

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO* XI

This was a tax

free Missouri Authority Bond bought in 1982prior to my marriage.

Five (5) years

It was recalled in 1988 and the TEN

THOUSAND ($10#000) DOLLARS received was then placed in my
checking account,
INTERROGATORY NO, 12

please indicate

whether you are willing to provide a copy of the financial
statement

or

Interrogatory

statements
Number

28

referred
of

to

in

Defendant's

response
First

Set

to
of

Interrogatories, located at Nate Knight Accounting, or whether
Defendant will be required to incur the cost and inconvenience
of subpoenaing such records.

Please indicate the same with

respect to the financial statement or statements located at
the office of Clara Wilburg*
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12

Yes,

see

attached.
INTERROGATORY NO, 13

Please describe in

detail the "many heirlooms11 you claim Defendant possesses in
response to Interrogatory Number 30 of Defendant's Fires Set
of Interrogatories
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13

from my mother around

1962.

grandmother helped make it.

A patchwork quilt

It was hand made and my

Bath are now deceased.

Value

priceless, ($10,000.00); Rocker high back spindle (era 1898)
irreplaceable,

value unknown priceless. ($700,00) given to

me by my mother twenty (26) years ago in 1967; High back
6

straight chair, value unknown ($500,00) , acquired in 1980 gift
from my mother; and one (1) pair of diamond earrings, a
birthday gift to me from my mother in 1985, small gold rose
bud with a diamond center, valued at ($550.00).
INTERROGATORY N O .

specific

information requested

Interrogatory

Number

36

of

14

Please provide the

in subparagraphs
Defendant's

First

(a-e) to
Set

of

Interrogatories, which information was omitted in Plaintiff's
first response to said Interrogatory.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY No. 14 Please see Financial
Summary attached hereto.
INTERROGATORY NO. 1$

Please indicate to

whom you reported that assets were stolen, as indicated in
subparagraph 12 of plaintiff's response to Interrogatories
Numbers 36 and 37 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories•
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO* 15

Moab City Police

Department, Steve Ross, February 26, 1994.
INTERROGATORY NO, 16 Indicate whether or
not there were any other individuals, in addition to the
individuals identified in plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory
Number 38 of Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, who may
testify at the trial of this action, and indicate the matters
upon which it is anticipated such individual(s) may testify.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16

Plaintiff Cheryl

Monders will testify on all issues raised by her Complaint;
Sharon Sellers, employee of the Outlaw Saloon, Inc., who will
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testify concerning the operation of the Saloon and J*w.
violence towards Cheryl? Debra Edwards, employee of the Outlaw
Saloon, inc., who will testify concerning the operation of the
Saloon and J.W. violence towards Cheryl; Joe Kingsley who will
testify with respect to the market value of the Outlaw Saloon;
Mary Lou Shupe, Abuse; Dennis Nielson, abuse; Dennis Wilberg,
Abuse; Mike Gillispie, abuse; Dan Black, Outlaw Saloon Inc,
#1 and #2; Don Covey, Canyonlands Motel and Outlaw Saloon;
Jeane Couchman, Canyonlands Motel and Outlaw Saloon; Maria
Fergurson, Outlaw Saloon, Inc. #1 and #2; Willie Tucker,
Canyonlands Motel, Outlaw saloon #1 and abuse.
JOANE REVIEW
INTERROGATORY NO, 17 Indicate whether you
are willing to obtain a copy of your payroll records which
show your earnings from January 1, 1994 to the present from
Smuin,

Rich

and

Marsing,

as

identified

in

answer

to

Defendant's request number 1 of Defendant's First Request for
Production of Documents. Alternatively, indicate whether you
are willing to sign a release or consent, authorizing the
release of such records to Defendant.
ANSWER

TO

INTERROGATORY

Employer's Quarterly Wage List.

NO*

17

See attached

Yes, I am willing to sign a

consent to release such records.
INTERROGATORY NO. 18

Indicate whether

your personal tax returns and tax returns for the business for
the Outlaw Saloon, for the calendar year 1993, have been
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completed.

If so, indicate whether you will provide a copy

of said tax returns.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18
completed and sent in.

Yes, they were

Yes I will provide a copy.

INTERROGATORY NO. 19

Describe in detail

all efforts undertaken by you, or anyone on your behalf, to
sell, or offer for sale, the business known as the Outlaw
Saloon, and the real property on which the Outlaw Saloon is
located. In responding to this Interrogatory, please identify
all individuals with whom contact has been made regarding a
prospective sale to the business, including the names and
addresses of prospective buyers, the names and addresses of
real estate brokers or agents involved in such prospective
sale, and any other individuals who may have been involved in
any such prospective transaction*
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 19

I have

told

a

thousand people that this business will be for sale upon the
completion

of

this

divorce.

The

names,

addresses and

telephone numbers is too lengthy to list at this time. These
efforts to sell to these various people are in an unofficial
nature pending the finality of this action.
INTERROGATORY NO. 20 Please identify any
appraisals, property evaluations or reevaluations conducted
on the real property and the business known as the Outlaw
Saloon.

In responding to such interrogatory, indicate the

name, address and telephone number of any person or firm who
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was involved in such appraisal, evaluation or reevaluation,
and indicate what information was provided to any such party
by you or anyone on your behalf to enable such party to
complete their appraisal, evaluation or reevaluation.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20

Bob

Muir

estimated value based on structure, size, type, age and the
quality of the construction.
HUNDRED

FIFTY

to

ONE

The value was between ONE

HUNDRED

SIXTY

THOUSAND

DOLLARS

($150,000.00 to $160/000.00) - Closed door business.

The

business was worth six (6%) percent of one (1) years profit.
He is now deceased.

Grand County Assessors Office.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21 Indicate the source

of the deposit of $37,912.35 into your Golden Passbook Savings
Account, #18378423, on September 19, 1990.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21

See

Financial

Summary attached hereto.
INTERROGATORY NO. 22

Indicate where the

funds from the withdrawal on October 2, 1990 in the amount of
$23,000,00,

from

the

account

referred

to

in the above

paragraph, were transferred.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22

They

were

transferred to M. C. Tangren for a down payment on the
property,

quonset hut, building

and

lot-

See attached

document for production #9.
INTERROGATORY NO. 23 Indicate whether you
are willing to sell the business known as the outlaw Saloon,
10

together with the real property on which it is located, and
all of your rights to purchase the adjacent lot #95, pursuant
to an option agreement with your uncle. If the answer to this
Interrogatory is "yes," indicate the price at which you would
be willing to sell these properties and assets.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23

Yes, I am willing

to sell the business known as the Outlaw Saloon Inc., of which
I am 100% stockholder and president together with the real
property on which it is located of which I am a joint tenant
with the Defendant whom has not contributed any monies for the
purpose of said lot* No I cannot sell something I do not have
on the adjacent lot #95.

I do not have an option.

INTERROGATORY NO, 24 Indicate whether you
would be willing to split with defendant the cost of an
appraisal for the business and real property on which the
Outlaw Saloon is located, if such appraisal can be completed
prior to the trial date. In responding to this Interrogatory,
indicate all conditions you and your counsel would require to
such an arrangement.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24
INTERROGATORY

NO.

NO. 25 Indicate if you are

willing to have a real estate expert engaged by Defendant,
inspect the premises, and receives all of the pertinent books
and records of the Outlaw Saloon.

If so, indicate what, if

any, books and records of the business you are not willing to
allow such person to review.
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 25
INTERROGATORY NO, 26

No,
Please describe in

detail all monies you claim are owed to you by the Outlaw
Saloon, or Defendant.

In responding to such interrogatory#

describe the date(s) such monies were advanced by you to the
Outlaw Saloon or Defendant, the source of such monies, and any
documentation,

instrumentsf

or

papers

evidencing

such

obligation or transfer of monies*
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 26

EIGHTY-NINE

THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-THREE ($89,193.00) DOLLARS plus
interest.

Amount of money documented.

money has been made.

No return on this

This money was put up by the Plaintiff

as the financier of the Outlaw Saloon #1 and #2* These monies
would

have

earned

the

Plaintiff

THIRTY-FIVE

THOUSAND

($35,000.00) DOLLARS in the period of time had this money been
placed in other endeavors.

See financial Summary attached

hereto.
INTERROGATORY

NO.

27

For each of the

Requests for Admission set forth in this set of discovery
which you deny, set forth in detail the factual basis for such
denial, and identify any documents or witnesses who provide
support for such denial.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 27

These

will

be

supplemented.
INTERROGATORY NO. 28

Describe in detail

all outstanding indebtedness or obligations of the Outlaw
12

Saloon, including date the indebtedness or obligation was
incurred,

name

and

address

of

the

creditor,

amount

of

indebtedness outstanding, and payment terms.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 28

Cheryl Monders,

indebtedness, ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
NINETY-THREE

($124,193,00) DOLLARS.

M.C. Tangren, FORTY

THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE DOLLARS AND SIXTY-NINE
($40,483-69) CENTS, monthly payment SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX
DOLLARS AND TWENTY-SIX ($456«26) CENTS, payment on terms on
Cheryl ten (10%) percent interest increasing compounded.
INTERROGATORY

NO.

29

Identify

any

individual or firm which you have engaged, or which you
anticipate engaging, to testify at trial regarding the value
of the business known as the Outlaw Saloon, the real property
on which it is located, and/or lot 95. In responding to this
Interrogatory, describe in detail the matters on which it is
anticipated such individual(s) or firm(s) will testify, and
describe in detail all documents, papers, materials, and other
information that has been provided or which it is anticipated
will be provided, to such individual(s) or firm(s), to enable
such party or parties to perform such work.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 29

Joe Kingsley

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1

Please provide

copies of the bank statements for the Outlaw Saloon, covering
the period beginning

from the date of inception of the
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business through September 30, 1994,

(These documents were

previously requested in Defendant's First Set of Discovery,
but

bank

statements

covering

only

Plaintiff's

personal

accounts were produced in response to this request*
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1

B

statements from 1986, 1988 - 1989 are missing*
present are sketchy.

a

n

k

1991 to

See attached.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 2

Please provide

a copy of the cash register receipts from the Outlaw Saloon,
for each day from January 1, through September 30, 1994.
Alternatively, Plaintiff can make these receipts available for
inspection at a mutually convenient time, and indicate when
such documents may be available.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2

C

a

S h

register receipts can be made available to Defendant's counsel
at the Outlaw Saloon.

Please advise which day would be

convenient through Plaintiff's counsel.
REQUEST

a

copy

of

any

FOR P R O D U C T I O N N O . 3

contracts,

correspondence

Please provide
or

documents

pertaining to any remodeling, improvements, refurbishing or
other construction performed on the real property and business
known as the Outlaw Saloon.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3 Omstruction
has not started.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 4

Please provide

any documentation, papers and writings which support your
14

claim that you contributed pre-marital monies or assets to the
business known as the Outlaw Saloon and the real property on
which it sits.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4

See attached

Financial Summary.
REQUEST

FOR PRODUCTION NO, 5

Please provide

monthly personal bank statements for any and all checking or
other accounts which would show your personal expenditures
during the calendar year 1994.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6

Please provide

copies of any contracts, correspondence, and other documents
pertaining to the option agreement with Marvin Tangren, and
the real property owned by Marvin C. Tangren, located adjacent
to the property on which the Outlaw Saloon
commonly known as Lot 95.

is located,

Such response should include any

correspondence between your counsel and Mr- Tangren, and from
Mr. Tangren to you or your counsel.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6 These items
were stolen. I reported them to Moab city Police on February
26, 1994.

See police report on production no. 12.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7

Please provide

copies of all corporate documents of the Outlaw Saloon, Inc.,
including articles of incorporation and bylaws, as amended;
minutes of meetings of, or action taken by, the board of
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directors, officers, and shareholders, and contracts between
the corporation and any third parties.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7

See attached

hereto,
REQUEST

FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8

please provide

copies of any exhibits you anticipate introducing at trial.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8

I

will

supplement.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9
copies

of any

documents

or writings

Please provide

which

reflect

any

outstanding indebtedness or obligation of The Outlaw Saloon.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9

See attached

hereto.
REQUEST F O R PRODUCTION

NO, io

Please provide

copies of all paystubs or other documentation which evidences
any compensation, direct or indirect, received by you from The
Outlaw Saloon during 1994.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10 Attached
hereto.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 11

Please provide

copies of all financial statements of The Outlaw Saloon
prepared by Nate Knight Accounting, Clara Wilburg, or any
other person or firm on behalf of you or The Outlaw Saloon.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11 See attached
hereto.
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 12

Please provide

a copy of any reports of stolen assets, as described in
Interrogatory Number 15.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12

See

attached hereto.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13

Please provide

copies of any tax returns, annual or quarterly, for 1993 and
1994, filed for either you personally or The Outlaw Saloon*
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13

See

attached hereto.
R E Q U E S T FOR PRODUCTION

NO. 14

Please provide

a copy of any appraisal, evaluation or assessment of the
business of The Outlaw saloon, and/or the real property on
which it is located, and Lot 95.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14
appraisal from Bob Muir was asked for.

The

Sizes, facts and

business figures were brought up but it was never completed.
He passed away.
R E Q U E S T FOR PRODUCTION

NO. 15

Please provide

a copy of any other documents identified in response to the
Interrogatories set forth*
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15 Attached
hereto.
DATED this £fl"day

of November, 1994.

^ O A 6 E PAPPAS WHITE
Attorney for Plaintiff
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STATE OF UTAH
county of Carbon

)
:
)

ss.

CHERYL MONDERS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and
states that she is the Defendant in the above-entitled action;
that she has read the above and foregoing and knows the
contents thereof, and that the same is true and correct to the
best of her knowledge, except as to those matters therein
stated upon information and belief, and as to such matters
believes the same to be true.

^YU^hM[ERYL M0NE
CHERYL
MONDERS
Subscribed and sworn to before me thi^
November, 1994.

/. '^leflsEfiaBo.

Mtfile

A

IA/Iffft

^/?-

My Commission Expires:

18

day of

/Minor
<t<*

ADDENDUM C
Plaintiffs Response to Defenant's
Request for Admissions

UYWalNttL

JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1
475 East Main
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (801) 637-0177
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHERYL MONDERS,
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
Vs.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR
ADMISSIONS

KENNETH WAYNE MONDERS,
Defendant.

]i Civil No. 9447-8

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn upon
oathf and hereby responds to Defendant's Requests for Admissions
as follows:
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
ADMISSION

NO,

1

Admit

that the present

business known as the Outlaw Saloon was commenced during the time
of the marriage, and that both you and Defendant, KENNETH MONDERS,
participated in the establishment of this business.
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 1
ADMISSION NO. 2

Denies Admission No. 1.
Admit that you and KENNETH

MONDERS entered into a contract providing for the establishment of
the business, under the terms of which MR. MONDERS would own a
fifty percent (50%) interest in the business.
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 2

Deny Admission No. 2.

ADMISSION NO. 3

Admit that it is your belief

that you have a valid option contract with MARVIN C. TANGREN, for
the purchase of the real property adjoining the property on which
the Outlaw Saloon is located, known as Lot 95, and that it is your
belief that such contract is enforceable.
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 3

Admits that CHERYL MONDERS

only has an agreement with MARVIN C. TANGREN for the purchase of
real property adjoining the Outlaw Saloon which he has refused to
honor.

Admits that CHERYL MONDERS has one legal opinion which

indicates that the contract may be enforceable but that the
expenses associated with such a suit would run between TEN and
FIFTEEN THOUSAND ($10,000 and $15,000) DOLLARS. Denies all of the
balance of the allegations in Admission No. 3.
ADMISSION NO. 4

Admit that you intend to pursue

legal action to enable you to exercise the option agreement.
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 4

Deny Admission No. 4.

ADMISSION NO. 5 Admit that Defendant is a party to
the option agreement described in the preceding two paragraphs, and
that such option agreement was entered into during the marriage
between Plaintiff and Defendant.
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 5
ADMISSION NO. 6

Admit

Deny Admission No. 5.
that the value of the

property which is the subject of the option agreement, is worth
substantially more than the option price of $10,000 provided in
paragraph 1 of such agreement.

2

ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 6

Objects to Admission No,

6 on the grounds that it is an attempt to value the existing value
of real estate as compared to an original option price for same
many years ago during an economic depression and, therefore it is
immaterial to the current proceedings.
ADMISSION NO. 7

Admit that you are unwilling to

sell the business known as "The Outlaw Saloon", together with the
real estate on which the business is located, and your rights to
the option agreement, for the total sum of $150,000.
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 7

The Plaintiff is unable to

respond to Admission No. 7 on the grounds that no information
concerning the alleged sale price has been made available with
respect to methods of payments etc. and, therefore, same are
denied.
ADMISSION NO. 8

Admit that you are unwilling to

sell the property described in the preceding paragraph, for the
total sum of $175,000.
ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 8

The Plaintiff is unable to

respond to Admission No. 8 on the grounds that no information
concerning the alleged sale price has been made available with
respect to methods of payments etc. and, therefore, same are
denied.
ADMISSION NO. 9

Admit that you are unwilling to

sell the property described in the preceding two paragraphs, for
the total sum of $200,000.

3

ANSWER TO ADMISSION NO. 9

The Plaintiff is unable to

respond to Admission No. 9 on the grounds that no information
concerning the alleged sale price has been made available with
respect to methods of payments etc. andf

therefore, same are

denied.
DATED this xf ?^day of October, 1994.

4U-^

:ERYL MCftJDERS, PI
Plaintiff
CHERYL
Subscribed and sworn to before me this,^A \ jrfC day of
October, 1994.

r

Notary Public
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DATED this ^S I day of October, 1994.

'A^LDM

JOAJJE"JXPPAS WHITE
Attorney for Plaintiff

ADDENDUM D
Trial Exhibit P-4

50

s

|

0

EXHHIT

CHERYL'S ASSETS AT TIME OF MARRIAGE

1.

cash in safety deposit box

2.

Savings at Williamsburg Bank

3.

IRA

4.

Checking account

685.30

5.

1 Krugerand

382.00

6.

Motel Stock

11,445.00

7.

Missouri Bond

-10,000.00

8.

The First Outlaw Saloon (cost basis)
(Value $50,000)

22.600.00

(opened 1978)

TOTAL

$ 9r090.00
15,524.00
9f000.00

S78.726.30

CHERYL'S SEPARATE ASSETS ACQUIRED AFTER MARRIAGE
Inheritance from father (1988)

16,600

Inheritance from mother 3#316
in cash and payments of $183*00
per month for seven years ($15,372)

18,688

TOTAL

PLUS ACCUMULATED INTEREST ON ALL ACCOUNTS FROM DATE OF MARRIAGE

